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NOTES
DISCLOSURE IN CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS:
THE PURSUIT OF CONSISTENCY AND CLARITY
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 requires any party filing a
plan of debtor reorganization to include a statement disclosing "adequate information" about the debtor to the voting creditors. 2 This
new disclosure scheme replaces the troublesome scheme available
under the former reorganization laws.3 The new Act, however,
never formally defines adequate disclosure, 4 forcing the courts to
define it on a case-by-case basis. 5
This Note will survey the case law under section 1125 and identify the standards that have evolved for the adequacy of disclosure.
The first section will discuss the role that disclosure plays in the
reorganization process and the interests that it is designed to protect. 6 The second section will analyze creditor objections to disclo-

sure statements and will discuss how the courts resolve such
objections. 7 The final section will analyze judicial interpretations of
the adequate disclosure requirements, focusing on the extent to
which they promote or protect policies underlying the disclosure
process. 8
I
THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN CHAPTER

11

A. Previous Vehicles for Reorganization and Disclosure
Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 9
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982):
"[A]dequate information" means information of a kind, and in sufficient
detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history
of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, that
would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of
claims or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment
about the plan ....
2
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1982).
3
See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
4 See Note, Disclosure of Adequate Information in a Chapter 11 Reorganization, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1808, 1808, 1811-15 (1981) (reporting that "adequate information" is not defined in current or previous bankruptcy law or in nonbankruptcy disclosure law).
5 See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 9-51 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 53-112 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 113-58 and accompanying text.
9 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2459 (1978).
1
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chapters X and XI of the Chandler Act 1 ° governed debtor reorganizations. Chapter X of the old statute applied only to corporate reorganizations."' A trustee controlled the debtor's business and
prepared a reorganization plan for the bankruptcy court. 12 The
court then held a hearing on the valuation of the business and decided whether to approve the plan.1 3 After approval, the judge
solicited acceptances from the creditors. x4 The debtor was not required to make a formal disclosure. Instead, once the plan was accepted, 1 5 the court held a confirmation hearing to make a going
concern valuation of the debtor's assets and to determine whether
the plan was "fair and equitable." 1 6 Often the Securities and Exchange Commission evaluated the debtor and reported to the
court.'

7

Congress enacted the valuation and approval hearing re-

quirements to protect public investors,' 8 but the process proved to
be often lengthy and complex. The resulting delays frequently
caused additional losses for creditors' 9 and generated data once de20
scribed as "an estimate compounded by a guess."
Chapter XI offered a less formal scheme for debtor arrangement with unsecured creditors. It promoted speed and simplicity in
the bankruptcy process 2 ' because only the debtor could file a plan.
10 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, §§ 101-399, 52 Stat. 840, 883-916 (repealed
1978).
11 See id. § 106(5), 52 Stat. at 883 ("'[D]ebtor' shall mean a corporation by or
against which a petition has been filed under this chapter .... ").
12

13
14
REV.

15
16

1125.02, at 1125-7 (15th ed. 1979).
Chandler Act §§ 169-70, 174, 52 Stat. at 890, 891.
See Note, Adequate Disclosure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 53 S. CAL. L.
1527, 1530 (1980).
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

Id.

Chandler Act §§ 179, 221, 52 Stat. at 892, 897 (repealed 1978).
See, e.g., Gardner, The SEC and Valuation Under ChapterX, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 440
(1943); Note, Valuation by the SEC in Reorganization, 55 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1941); Note,
supra note 14, at 1530; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.] ("The valuation consists of an estimate of the earning
power of the reorganized debtor, and the appropriate market capitalization rate of that
estimated income stream. The income stream thus estimated, capitalized as appropriate, is then distributed among the classes of creditors and equity security holders
17

18 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 225.
19 See id.; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, at 1125-11; King, Chapter
11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 109 (1979).
20 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 225.
21 One cannot overemphasize the advantages of speed and simplicity to
both creditors and debtors. Chapter XI allows a debtor to negotiate a
plan outside of court and, having reached a settlement. . . permits the
debtor to bind all unsecured creditors to the terms of the arrangement.
From the perspective of creditors, early confirmation of a plan of arrangement: first, generally reduces administrative expenses which have
priority over the claims of unsecured creditors; second, permits creditors
to receive prompt distributions on their claims with respect to which interest does not accrue after the filing date; and third, increases the ulti-
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Moreover, the parties could negotiate without judicial involvement.
This chapter, however, did not require formal disclosure. Originally, Congress believed that unsecured creditors did not need elaborate disclosure because they were often involved in the debtor's
business operation. 2 2 In enacting the new bankruptcy legislation,
Congress recognized that some debtors were soliciting acceptances
from creditors who had little or no knowledge of the debtor's business or of the plan itself.23 Thus, some investor protection ap24
peared necessary.
B.

"Adequate Disclosure" Under Chapter 11

The disclosure requirements of the debtor 25 reorganization
provisions in the current bankruptcy code contained in section
112526 of new chapter 1127 were designed to further the policies of
investor protection and simplicity. 28 A debtor or creditor submitting a reorganization plan 29 must also submit a disclosure statement
mate recovery on creditor claims by minimizing the adverse effect on the
business which often accompanies efforts to operate an enterprise under
the protection of the Bankruptcy Act.
124 CONG. REC. 32,405 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 34,005 (1978).
22
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 225.
23 Id. at 225-26.
24
Id. at 226 ("Chapter XI needs some form of investor protection in order to make
it a fairer reorganization vehicle.").
25
11 U.S.C. § 109 (1982) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a person
that resides in the United States, or has a domicile, a place of business, or
property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under
this title.
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 [liquidation] of this title
only if such person is not(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association, homestead association, credit union, or industrial bank or similar institution
which is an insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(h)); or
(3) a foreign insurance company, bank, .. or credit union, engaged
in such business in the United States ....
(d) Only a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title, except a stockholder or a commodity broker, and a railroad may be a
debtor under chapter 11 of this title.
Reorganization under chapter 11 is thus available to most individual and corporate
debtors.
26
11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982).
27
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
28 See iqfra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. See also supra note 9. Chapter 13 of
the new bankruptcy code, governing debt adjustment for individual wage earners, contains no similar provisions for disclosure. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1982). The provisions for filing and confirmation of a plan under chapter 13 are contained in 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-25 (1982).
29
Chapter 11 reorganizations commence with a petition by either the debtor or the
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to provide the voting creditors with background on the debtor and
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1982). For 120 days after the filing, only the debtor may
file a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982). After that time, or after 180 days if the debtor
has not filed an accepted plan, or at any time after a trustee has been appointed in the
interests of the creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982), any party in interest may file
a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1982).
The reorganization plan must classify creditors with substantially similar claims or
interests together for purposes of voting on the plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1123(a)
(1982). Creditors that would have their legal or equitable rights altered, or that would
not be compensated in full under the plan, are deemed to be "impaired" unless they
agree to the modification of their rights. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). The plan must specify the treatment of the impaired classes. I1 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(3) (1982). It must treat
each creditor in a class in the same manner, unless a creditor specifically agrees to less
favorable treatment. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1982). Impaired creditors may vote to accept or reject the plan, whereas unimpaired creditors are deemed to have accepted the
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1982).
The party proposing the plan can submit it to the bankruptcy court for approval
after he solicits the acceptances of creditors holding two-thirds in value of outstanding
claims, or two-thirds in value and one-half in number of the outstanding claims, of each
impaired class. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c)-(d), 1129(a) (1982). The court excludes acceptances and rejections from entities that it concludes have not voted in good faith. I1
U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1982). Consequently, it is not necessary for all creditors in every impaired class to accept the plan.
The court holds a hearing on confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1982).
The requirements for confirmation are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982). In short, a
plan, submitted in good faith and in conformance with the provisions of chapter 11, will
be confirmed if all impaired classes accept it by the required majorities and will receive
at least as much as they would have through a liquidation of the debtor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7)-(8) (1982). For a complete discussion of the confirmation process, see 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12,
1129.01; Hopper, Confirmation of a Plan Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 IND. L. REV. 501 (1982); King, supra note 19, at 129-

30.
If the proponent of a plan does not receive acceptances from the required majorities, the plan will normally fail. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982). The proponent may be able to
confirm the plan over the dissent of nonaccepting classes if the interests of the dissenters are protected. This is known as "cramdown." See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. LJ. 133, 140-41 & n.65
(1979).
The basic cramdown provision reads:
[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section. ..
are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of
the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such
paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, and has not accepted, the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(1) (1982). There are different conditions of fairness and equality
for classes of secured claims, unsecured claims, and ownership interests. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2) (1982). Generally, a dissenting creditor must receive the value equal in
amount to his claim or interest. Since the "fair and equitable" test is more difficult to
meet than the "value at liquidation" test, proponents are well advised to seek the acceptance of each class. See King, supra note 19, at 130.
For a complete discussion of cramdown, see Klee, supra;Miller, Bankruptcy Code Cram
Down Under Chapter 11: New Threat to ShareholderInterests, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1059, 1076-83
(1982); Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58
N.C.L. REV. 925 (1980).
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the plan.3 0 The statement must contain "adequate information concerning the debtor's financial status." 3' Proponents may offer different disclosure to different classes of creditors if each statement
contains adequate information for the typical investor of that
class.3 2 The bankruptcy court will hold a hearing to evaluate each
disclosure statement and to consider any proposed modifications or
objections; both the creditor and the debtor must file any objections
33
to the statement with the court in advance of the hearing.
Congress intended that, under the new disclosure scheme,
creditors could independently evaluate the plan without extensive
judicial participation in the process.3 4 Congress left the standard
for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure vague to allow flexibility.3 5
The factors that Congress believed the courts should consider are
the cost of preparing the statement, the nature and history of the
debtor, the condition of the debtor's records, the need for prompt
solicitation of votes, and the need to protect the investor.3 6 Congress noted, however, that the "[c]ourts will take a practical approach" in each case, considering such factors only when
necessary.3 7 Furthermore, "otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy
law rule[s] or regulation[s]" do not govern the standard of adequacy
30
11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982). The plan and the disclosure statement may not be
separate documents. In re Bel Air Assocs., Ltd., 4 Bankr. 168 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980),
(plan itself contained "adequate information").
31
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1982).
32
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). See supra note 2. An "investor typical of holders of

claims or interests of the relevant class" is one who (1) has a claim or interest of the
relevant class, (2) has a relationship with the debtor similar to that of the other members
of the class, and (3) has an ability similar to other members of the class to obtain information sources other than the disclosure. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2) (1982).
33 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a) (adopted in 1982).
34 If adequate disclosure is provided to all creditors and stockholders whose
rights are to be affected, then they should be able to make an informed
judgment of their own, rather than having the court or the Securities and
Exchange Commission inform them in advance of whether the proposed
plan is a good plan.
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 226.
The SEC may advise the court on the adequacy of a disclosure statement, but it may
not appeal the court's decision. Id. at 409; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.. 121
(1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. SEC participation in other phases of reorganization is limited. Recently the commissioners voted to reduce active participation in chapter 11 proceedings to traditional matters such as adequacy of disclosure. Critics believe
that such a move will endanger the protection of public investors in the reorganization
process. See SEC Votes to Cut Its Role in Bankruptcy Cases, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 5.
35 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 409 ("Precisely what constitutes adequate information in any particular instance will develop on a case-by-case basis."); S. REP., supra note
34, at 121 ("The information required will necessarily be governed by the circumstances
of the case.").
36 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 409; S. REP., supra note 34, at 121.
37 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 409.
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under chapter 11,38 and Congress prohibited the Supreme Court
from using its rule-making power to define a standard for disclosure. 39 Thus, Congress has left the bankruptcy courts with little guidance as to what constitutes adequate disclosure.
C.

Disclosure and the Protection of the Parties' Interests

In formulating the new chapter 11, Congress changed several
of the requirements of the previous law in an attempt to preserve
both the advantage of expediency present in the old chapter XI and
the advantage of creditor protection present in the old chapter X.
Congress retained the use of a hearing from the former chapter X,
noting that the hearing is "designed to protect against end-runs
around the disclosure requirement. ' 40 At the special disclosure
hearings, however, the court merely decides whether to approve the
disclosure;4 1 creditors must approve the plan. 4 2 Thus, Congress deleted the requirement of a valuation at the disclosure hearing.
43
Although Congress did not prohibit valuations in the new code, it
pointed out that "[i]n many smaller cases [in chapter X], and in
some of the larger cases that are not found in chapter XI, [the valuation that chapter X required] is an unnecessary process, and far too
costly and time-consuming. ' 44 In theory, then, the new disclosure
hearing should protect the creditors' interest in being reasonably
informed and all the interests of the parties in minimizing costs of
time and money.
45
The flexible "hypothetical reasonable investor" standard of
adequacy of disclosure contained in chapter 11 is also aimed at protecting the parties' interests in expediency and creditor protection.
Congress decided that several factors should be considered in determining adequate disclosure, including "the circumstances of [each]
case, the relative sophistication of the creditors, and their access to
38
11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1982). The thrust of this provision is to prevent disclosure
in chapter I1 reorganizations from being measured by the disclosure requirements of
the securities laws. See H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 409; S. REP., supra note 34, at 121-22.
An official or agency, such as the SEC, with a duty to enforce other laws pertaining to
disclosure, may offer opinions at the hearing concerning the adequacy of the information. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1982).

39

H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 409.

Id. at 227.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(b), (c), (d).
11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982); see supra note 29.
43 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227. Valuations are necessary in cramdown situations to determine sufficiency of the proposed distribution to a dissenting class of creditors or to a dissenting creditor. See Pachulski, supra note 29, at 951-65.
44 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982) provides that "[t]he
court may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an appraisal of the debtor's assets."
45 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40
41
42
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other sources of information about the plan."' 46 This flexible approach should, for example, allow the debtor to draw up a disclosure statement based on the state of his books rather than stretching
his financial means by preparing an unnecessarily detailed statement. As Congress noted, "[f]requently, the debtor's books will be
in shambles at the time of bankruptcy, and reconstruction could be a
long and costly process. If there is no need for the information
under the circumstances, reconstruction may be dispensed with
"47

This flexibility also protects the relevant interests of the creditors. For reorganizations involving large public corporations, adequate disclosure is essential for long-run protection of shareholder
investments. 4 8 Formerly, in chapter X cases, stockholders could rely
on SEC advisory reports for information on and an evaluation of the
plan. 4 9 Congress recognized that "[t]he public protection policy of
the securities laws must be balanced with the protection of creditors
[sic] rights in bankruptcy cases, which is frequently facilitated by
speed in the reorganization process." 50 Under chapter 11, the
courts may require disclosure in great length and detail to protect
stockholders. For creditors of nonpublic debtors and for nonshareholders, the flexibility of the process removes the costs in time and
money of a lengthy and often unnecessary valuation and disclosure
process.
Despite the recognized need for flexibility, the courts have inev46
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 226; see S. REP., supra note 34, at 121 (circumstances
of each case will determine information necessary in disclosure).
47
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 226; see also S. REP., supra note 34, at 121 ("Subsection (a)(1) expressly incorporates consideration of the nature and history of the debtor
and the condition of its books and records into the determination of what is reasonably
practicable to supply"); Note, supra note 4, at 1817 ("Congress. ..was willing to balance increased information and the possibility of uncovering fraud against increased
accounting costs and delays.").
48
[I]nvestor protection is most critical when the company in which the public invested is in financial difficulties and is forced to seek relief under the
bankruptcy laws. . . .As public investors are likely to be junior or
subordinated creditors or stockholders, it is essential for them to have
legislative assurance that their interests will be protected. Such assurance
should not be left to a plan negotiated by a debtor in distress and senior
or institutional creditors who will have their own best interest to look
after.
S. REP., supra note 34, at 10.
49
Some have argued that creditors and stockholders simply are unable to
make an intelligent or informed decision without the SEC's report, all of
the valuation evidence developed at the disclosure hearing, and an order
of the court finding the plan worthy of consideration and approving the
plan. The purpose of the approval hearing, court approval, and an SEC
report in chapter X was public investor protection.
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 225 (footnotes omitted).
50 Id. at 229.
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itably formulated some definite guidelines as to the quantity and
quality of information required to meet the adequacy standard. 5 ' In
evaluating these judicial standards, it is necessary to consider the
extent to which they further the congressional purposes of cost-effi52
cient disclosure and investor protection.
II
CREDITORS'

OBJECTIONS AND THE COURTS'

DETERMINATION OF ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE

If a creditor objects to the contents of a disclosure statement, it
must file with the bankruptcy court and voice those objections at the
approval hearing. 53 There are three types of objections creditors
may raise concerning the adequacy of a disclosure statement. First,
a creditor may object to the "quantitative" nature of the information
disclosed; the creditor complains that the statement does not contain sufficient information for the hypothetical typical investor of its
class to make an informed judgment on the plan. 54 Second, a credi-

tor may claim that the disclosure statement raises both "quantitative" and "qualitative" questions. Here, the creditor objects to
factually unsupported opinions in the disclosure statement. 5 5 Finally, a creditor may object only to the "qualitative" nature of the
information. In these cases, the creditor claims that the information
is inconsistent, incorrect, or in conflict with the creditor's own in56
dependent information.
A.

Adequacy and Questions of Insufficient Information

Quantitative questions of disclosure have generally turned on a
typical investor's ability to establish information for itself with no
strict standard for determining sufficiency. 57 Where a class of creditors is sophisticated and able to garner independent information
about the debtor, a bare minimum of disclosure may be sufficient. 58
Where a class of creditors is less sophisticated, courts require more
comprehensive and detailed disclosure statements. 59 As the bank51 See infra notes 52-113 and accompanying text.
52 One commentator has characterized the scheme for investor protection in chapter II as fostering an "every-man-for-himself" attitude. Miller, supra note 29, at 1087.
53 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a).
54 See infra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
57 In avoiding strict standards of adequacy, the courts are apparently following the
will of Congress. Cf. supra note 35.
58 See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
59 The bankruptcy courts have held, for instance, that the disclosure statement
must be more than a summary of the reorganization plan. See In re Adana Mortgage
Bankers, 14 Bankr. 29, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). The plan itself may be a sufficient
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ruptcy court noted in In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 60
"[tihe kind and form of information is left to the judicial discretion
61
of the court on a case by case basis."
1. Sophisticated Creditors and Minimal Adequacy Analysis
The courts have generally not required highly detailed disclosure statements when the hypothetical reasonable investor is a
member of a class of "sophisticated" creditors, whose "ability to obtain . . . information from sources other than . . . disclosure" 6 2 is
substantial. "Sophisticated" creditors may include banks, 63 partners of the debtor, 64 or creditors who have litigated against the
debtor in cases that required "vigorous discovery."' 65 For instance,
in In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 66 creditors objected to
the failure to file any disclosure statement with the plan. The court,
in approving a subsequent statement that was "perfunctory and
modest in extent," 67 noted that the debtor could not furnish any
68
information not already available to the objecting creditors.
Although courts generally approve modest disclosure statements offered to sophisticated creditors, they do not waive the disdisclosure statement. See In re Bel Air Assocs., 4 Bankr. 168, 175 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1980); see also In re Forrest Hills Assocs., 18 Bankr. 104, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982), where
the court noted:
[The disclosure] statement together with a plan should give interested
parties adequate information so they can make their own determination
to accept or reject. The circumstances of each case should control
whether the disclosure information and plan are separate documents or
one document combining disclosure information with the plan and the
amount and kind of information.
For a discussion of the comprehensiveness required of disclosure statements for unsophisticated creditors, see infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
60 8 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
61
Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
62
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2) (1982).
63
See In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 14 Bankr. 29, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
64 See In re Bel Air Assocs., 4 Bankr. 168, 175 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980). In Bel Air,
the limited partner of the debtor was deemed to have enough access to information,
including that which was supplied in the plan, to make an informed decision; no disclosure statement was required.
65 In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 Bankr. 10, 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980) ("vigorous discovery" in litigation one factor determining adequate disclosure).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 12.
68
Id. The court held:
[N]othing in § 1125 . . . exempts any debtor from its terms or excuses
the filing and requirement for prior approval of a Disclosure Statement
under the circumstances now before the court. ...
. . . [T]he filing of a Disclosure Statement to each class of a plan and
approval by the court is a prerequisite to solicitation of acceptances...
of the debtor's plan.
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closure requirement altogether. In In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 69
the bankruptcy court noted that where the disclosure statements
were prepared to benefit creditor banks, they need not "be as complete, perhaps, as required to a 'hypothetical typical investor' " of
the class.7 0 Nonetheless, the court warned that "these sophisticated
creditors . . . are not expected to be mindreaders or clairvoyant.

The basic financial information must be supplied in the statement."7 1 The court did not explain what constituted "basic financial information," but the message is clear: reorganization plan
72
proponents should provide some level of disclosure in all cases.
2.

UnsophisticatedCreditors and Extensive Disclosure Analysis

The bankruptcy courts interpret section 1125(a) as requiring
more extensive disclosure when a less sophisticated class of creditors is involved in the proceedings. These courts usually require as
much information as possible concerning costs of reorganization,
the debtor's history, estimates and projections of the future business, claims, liquidation analysis, and other alternatives. Nonetheless, they have developed no clear standard of quantitative adequacy
to evaluate disclosure statements directed at unsophisticated
creditors.
In In re Stanley Hotel,73 for example, the court noted:
[T]he purpose of a disclosure statement is to inform equity holders and claimants, asfully as possible, about the probable financial
results of acceptance or rejection of a particular plan. [T]he information to be provided should be comprised of all those factors
presently known to the plan proponent that bear upon the success
74
or failure of the proposals contained in the plan.
The court also reasoned that the statement should be as simple as
possible and not overburdened with information that would be useless to the typical investor. 75 The Stanley Hotel court avoided defin69

14 Bankr. 29 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
Id. at 31.
71 Id.; see In re Egan, 33 Bankr. 672, 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (quoting In re Adana
Mortgage Brokers, 14 Bankr. 29 (Bankr N.D. Ga. 1980)).
72 For another discussion of how the bankruptcy courts have developed an approach of leniency of disclosure for sophisticated creditors, see Comment, Disclosure of
"Adequate Information" Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, in ANN. SURv. BANKR. L.
1983, at 315, 325-27 (1983). The author's analysis hinges on the requirement of a statement for sophisticated creditors, not on the contents of the disclosure statement.
73 13 Bankr. 926 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
74 Id. at 929 (emphasis supplied).
75 Id. at 933-34. "A disclosure statement must be meaningful to be understood,
and it must be understood to be effective. . . . Accordingly, . . . overburdening...
may ultimately result in reducing the disclosure statement to an overlong, incomprehensible, ineffective collection of words to those whose interests are to be served by disclosure." Id. at 933.
70
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ing those "factors" or their scope, however, explaining that
Congress intended to provide "flexible disclosure requirements to
'76
be administered by the courts."
The flexibility of the adequacy standard leads to confusion
among plan proponents regarding the quantity of information the
courts will require in a disclosure statement. In Stanley Hotel, the
court required eleven amendments regarding the future course of
the business, prospective financing, claims against the corporation
and alternatives available to creditors before finding that the plan
provided adequate information to the objecting creditor. 7 7 In In re
Werth,78 a group of creditors, including a leasing company and a
bank, questioned the adequacy of a debtor's disclosure statement. 79
The court ordered the proponent to incorporate ten modifications,
including information regarding adverse claims, estimates of fair
market value, alternatives, and anticipated expenses of litigation.8 0
At least one court has developed a more objective standard for
determining the adequacy of disclosure. In In re A.C. Williams Co., 8 1
two sets of creditors filed objections to a debtor's disclosure state76
Id. at 930. The court noted that "§ 1125(a) does not provide a specific list of
elements that must be present in order for a disclosure statement to fulfill its purposes
.
.Id. at 929.
77 Id. at 934.
78
29 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
79 Id. at 221.
80 The debtor agreed to eight modifications at the hearing. The court subsequently
required the other two changes. Id. at 223-24. Other courts have required extensive,
detailed disclosure. In In re William F. Gable Co., 10 Bankr. 248, 249-50 (Bankr. N.D.
W. Va. 1981), the court ordered that a disclosure statement be amended to include
information on administrative costs, the debtor's history, claims, accounts receivable,
minimum dividends, and return on liquidation. In In re Hughes Marina, 16 Bankr. 6
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980), the court required the debtor to provide extensive financial
information, cash flow statements, and details of an arrangement with the proprietor of
the debtor's antique business.
These two cases illustrate that creditor sophistication is not the only factor courts
use to decide whether adequate disclosure has occurred. In both cases, banking institutions were among the objecting creditors.
One commentator proposing highly inclusive disclosure for unsophisticated creditors suggests several areas of "informational input" to satisfy the needs of solicited creditors. Note, supra note 14, at 1551-56. The areas of consideration include management
(past and future), debtor's current and historical financial status, liquidation analysis,
treatment of claims under the plan, and effectuation. Id. The courts have recognized all
of these as important facets of disclosure. See, e.g., In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 Bankr.
173, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
Another commentator has concluded that "the courts have perhaps been over-exacting and over-particular in the quality and quantity of information demanded. . . . It
is manifest that compounding and lengthening a document may do more harm than
good, in the sense of rendering the document ineffective." Comment, supra note 72, at
335-36. Unfortunately, this commentator neither describes the harm nor proposes a
remedy.
81
25 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
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ment, claiming that it did not convey adequate information.8 2 After
noting that the existence of "adequate information under [section
1125] must be determined on a case-to-case basis under flexible
standards," 8 3 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio proposed using the following specified criteria to measure the
adequacy of disclosure:
1) the incidents which led to the filing of the Chapter 11; 2) a
description of available assets and their value; 3) the anticipated
future of the company; 4) the source of information for the disclosure statement; 5) disclaimer; 6) present condition of the company while in Chapter 11; 7) claims scheduled; 8) the estimated
return to the creditors if liquidated; 9) the accounting process
informaused and the identity of the person who furnished the
84
tion; 10) future management of the debtor; 11) plan.
The court found that the disclosure statement met the eleven criteria.8 5 Although these criteria would be useful in defining the scope
of extensive disclosure, the language of the opinion suggests that
the court intended a case-by-case analysis with respect to the need
for disclosure of each criterion.8 6 Thus, these criteria do not provide plan proponents with concrete guidelines concerning
disclosure.
B.

Adequacy and Questions of Opinion Information

Creditors often object to factually unsupported opinions in the
guise of disclosed information because the sufficiency and accuracy
of the disclosed information is questionable when phrased in terms
of opinion. The bankruptcy courts have held a plan proponent must
provide factual support when offering an opinion in a disclosure
statement.
1. Development of the FactualBasis Requirement
In In re Civitella87 (Civitella I), a creditor filed a plan accompanied by a disclosure statement. The creditor contended the new
plan would be superior to a forced liquidation of the debtor's assets. 8 8 The debtor challenged the disclosure statement on the
ground that the allegation was an unsupported opinion. 8 9 Relying
82
83
84
85
86

87
88

89
for a

Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176.
14 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 152-53. A debtor is not precluded from objecting to a disclosure statement
plan that a creditor has filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a).
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on legislative history, 90 the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the new Bankruptcy Code requires
disclosure statements to contain factual support for all opinions. 91
The court did not, however, specify which allegations it found
inappropriate.
In In re Civitella92 (Civitella II), the court denied a motion for
reconsideration brought by three secured creditors. Listing several
allegations found in the creditor's disclosure statement, the court
noted that "[n]ot one ... [was] supported by a scintilla of factual
information anywhere in the disclosure statement." 93 The court reiterated its earlier holding that a plan proponent may not include
opinions in a disclosure statement without factual support. 9 4 The
court noted that other bankruptcy courts require extensive and specific information as a condition of approval 9 5 and concluded that
"[t]he thrust of these recent decisions has been to require that detailed factual information be provided in Chapter 11 disclosure
96
statements."
2.

Applications of the FactualBasis Requirement

A single instance of unsupported opinion in a disclosure statement requires the application of the same factual basis standard implicated by the broad and repeated opinions found in the Civitella
cases. In In re East Redley Corp.,97 the debtor objected to a disclosure
statement in which the creditor opined that the value of real property was significantly less than the value that the debtor had listed. 9 8
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found that a factual basis for the creditor's estimate of value was
necessary because "[s]uch information is essential for a party weighing the credibility and merits of the plan." 99
90

A plan is necessarily predicated on knowledge of the assets and liabilities being dealt with an [sic] on factually supported expectations as to the
future course of the business sufficient to meet the feasibility standard in
section 1 130(a)(11) of [this] title. It may thus be necesasry [sic] to provide estimates or judgments for that purpose. Yet it remains practicable
to describe, in such detail as may be relevant and needed, the basis for
the plan and the data on which supporters of the plan rely.
S. REP., supra note 34, at 121 (quoted in part in Civitella, 14 Bankr. at 153).
91 14 Bankr. at 153.
92
15 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
93
Id. at 207.
94 Id. at 208.
95 The court cited In re William F. Gable Co., 10 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va.
1981) and In re Hughes Marina, 16 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980). See supra note 80
for a discussion of those two cases.
96 In re Civitella, 15 Bankr. at 208 (emphasis added).
97
16 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
98 Id. at 430.
99 Id. The court rejected the debtor's objection to the accuracy of the value be-
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In In re Egan'0 0 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Illinois recently became the second court to adopt the factual basis requirement. The debtor's disclosure statement relied heavily
on the unsubstantiated assertion that a national economic recovery
would cure the debtor's problems. 0 1 The court concluded that
"without factual support, statements of opinion or belief are entirely
02
inappropriate in [d]isclosure [s]tatements."'
None of the factual basis decisions define the quantity or quality
of factual support necessary under section 1125.103 The courts rely
upon the legislative history and the nebulous wording of section
1125 to stress the need for flexibility. 10 4 Furthermore, the decisions
do not discriminate among different degrees of opinion; a disclosure statement puffing "my plan is better than your liquidation" is
subject to court ordered modification, as is a statement containing
an unsupported appraisal of a piece of property.
C.

Adequacy and Questions of Inconsistent Information

Qualitative questions of adequacy arise in challenges to the accuracy of disclosed information. A disclosure statement may contain inconsistent or incorrect information. Despite objections to
such statements, courts have accepted them without amendment.
In the leading case of In re Hughes Marina,' 0 5 impaired creditors
objected to conflicting statements in the debtor's disclosure statement and to projections of the future course of business that were
inconsistent with the debtor's tax returns. 106 The bankruptcy court
conditionally approved the statement despite the alleged inconsistencies, requiring only that the financial information be completed. 1° 7 The court explained that the alleged errors did not
require amendment because "rather than resulting in a denial of the
cause the creditor had included the value that the debtor had assigned to the property in
the disclosure statement. Id. The court also noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not
require valuation. Id. Similarly, in In re Fierman, 21 Bankr. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982), the court rejected a disclosure statement in which the debtor valued a piece of
property without providing factual support.
100 33 Bankr. 672 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
1i0
Id. at 673, 676.
102
Id. at 675.
103 See, e.g., In re Civitella, 15 Bankr. 206, 208 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
104 See, e.g., In re Civitella, 14 Bankr. at 152; In re Fierman, 21 Bankr. at 315; In re
Egan, 33 Bankr. at 675.
105 16 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
106 Id.
107
Id. See also In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 Bankr. 173, 176 (Bankr N.D. Ohio 1982)
(inconsistencies in plan affecting feasibility more appropriately contemplated at confirmation hearing); In re Stanley Hotel, 13 Bankr. 926, 929-30 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (purpose of disclosure statement to provide enough information for reasonable persons to
make informed choice regarding plan acceptance).
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approval of the disclosure statement, [the inconsistencies and inaccuracies] simply illustrate to the reader . . .why they should not
vote for the plan as proposed. That is what a disclosure statement is
08
supposed to do."'
Although the bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to weed
out inconsistencies and inaccuracies, 109 these deficiencies can be so
misleading as to warrant rejection of the disclosure statement. In In
re New Haven Radio," 10 the bankruptcy court rejected a disclosure
statement in which the debtor had "injected . . . innumerable
claims and statements which range[d] from inaccurate to misleading
and from inappropriate to defamatory.""' The court reasoned that
"the cumulative effect is clearly a sufficient basis for [rejection]. '""1 2
New Haven Radio demonstrates that the misleading effect in inaccuracies can be damaging enough to warrant rejection of a disclosure
statement. The case does little, however, to define the line between
permissible and impermissible inaccuracy.
III
RELEVANT INTERESTS AND THE DETERMINATION OF
ADEQUACY IN THE DISCLOSURE PROCESS

A.

Sophisticated Creditors and Minimal Adequacy
Requirements

The requirement of modest disclosure for sophisticated creditors was not unexpected.1 3 Congress itself noted that the flexibility
of the case-by-case standard "may be used, for example, where a
very large class required only limited disclosure, while other classes
' 14
required more extensive disclosure." "
One commentator has suggested that sophisticated creditors
may not require the assistance of disclosure at all because creditors
such as banks and finance companies can easily protect their own
In re Hughes Marina, 16 Bankr. at 6.
The bankruptcy courts have also been reluctant to allow the hearing to become a
discovery process. See In re Georgetown of Kettering, 17 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
198 1). In Kettering, the court determined that the disclosure hearing should operate independently of the discovery rules predating the new bankruptcy code: "The requirement of a disclosure statement ...
should not be read to infer [sic] a corresponding
creditor right of a fishing expedition." Id. at 75.
110 18 Bankr. 977 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
III ld. at 980-81.
112 Id. at 981. See also In re Hughes Marina, 16 Bankr. at 6 (noting that inconsistencies illustrate reason for creditors to reject plan).
113 Commentators predicted a lenient standard of disclosure for creditors with suffiI08
109

cient information shortly after the enactment of chapter 11. See Note, supra note 4, at
1817 n.69; Note, supra note 14, at 1548-49.
114 H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227.
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interests.1 1 5 This suggestion ignores the fact that these creditors
are impaired and are therefore statutorily entitled to judicial approval of a disclosure statement before they vote on a reorganization plan. I t 6 Some information, such as projections or other
1 17
estimates, may not be available even to a sophisticated creditor.
Congress recognized that the former chapter XI scheme of little or
no valuation and disclosure left even sophisticated creditors who
were very familiar with the debtor "in the dark."' 1 8 Congress thus
sought to protect against "end-runs" 1 19 around disclosure by requiring a disclosure statement with each plan. Thus, some form of
120
disclosure is necessary to protect all creditors.
Requiring only a minimum of disclosure for sophisticated creditors offers significant advantages. Such disclosure promotes expediency and financial savings because debtors spend less time and
money preparing a disclosure statement and creditors spend less
time waiting for disclosure. 12 1 A minimal disclosure requirement
for sophisticated creditors also fills the information gap created by
the elimination of the valuation requirement of the old chapter X.122
115
See Note, supra note 14, at 1549 ("[sophisticated creditors] will be able to obtain
whatever information from the debtor that they deem necessary, and should be able to

interpret that information without the assistance of the bankruptcy provisions requiring
disclosure.") (footnote omitted).
116
I1 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982).
117
In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 14 Bankr. 29, 30-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)
(court found inadequate disclosure statement that contained no information as to valuations, projections, or risks); In re William F. Gable Co., 10 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. N.D.W.
Va. 1981) (court ordered disclosure statement amended to include estimates concerning
certain costs and accounts receivable).
118
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 225.
119
Id. at 227.
120
See cases cited supra note 117; supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; see also In
re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). As the
court in In re Northwest RecreationalActivities, Inc. explained:
Although it is clear that this . . . case is unlike the situation where a Disclosure Statement is necessary to inform and protect the unsophisticated
creditor, Congress made no distinction between types of Chapter 11
cases. . . . The § 1125 requirement of a Disclosure Statement applies to
all debtors, large, small, complicated, simple; many or few creditors or
classes.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
121
The court in In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 Bankr. at 11 n. 1,
observed that Congress had suggested a "balancing of interests" among such things as
"the cost of preparation of the statements, the need for the relative speed in solicitation
and confirmation, and, of course, the need for investor proection" (quoting H.R. REP.,
supra note 17, at 409). The court determined that the objecting creditors had "access to
the kind of information necessary to form an informed decision on a proposed plan or
reorganization." Id. at 11. The court approved a disclosure statement which was "perfunctory and modest in extent." Id. at 12; see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
122
H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227.
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Less Sophisticated Creditors and a More Extensive
Disclosure Requirement

When impaired creditors are less sophisticated or are not in a
position to discover relevant information on their own, the courts
tend to require a detailed disclosure statement.' 2 3 Because chapter
11 eliminates the valuation requirement, this extensive disclosure
requirement for less sophisticated creditors furthers the legislative
24
purpose of creditor protection.1
Nonetheless, little guidance exists as to what belongs in more
extensive disclosure statements.' 25 Both courts and commentators
have expressed concern that disclosure statements are often
overburdened with unnecessary information. 2 6 Nevertheless, the
courts have not attempted to provide more concrete disclosure
guidelines. For example, in In re Stanley Hotel,127 the court was dissatisfied with the debtor's disclosure statement but did not explain
28
what "factors . . . bear upon the success or failure" of a plan.
Similarly, in In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 129 the court failed to explain what would comprise "basic financial information."' 130 Finally,
123
See, e.g., In re Werth, 29 Bankr. 220, 223-24 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (court lists
specific ways in which statement must be revised for greater accuracy); In re Stanley

Hotel, 13 Bankr. 926, 934 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (court sets out specific corrections,
explanations, and clarification in statement).
Congress noted that there would be cases, usually involving the restructuring of
124
large, publicly owned debtors, where a valuation would be an essential part of a disclosure hearing. H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227. The bankruptcy court is not, however,
required to appraise the debtor's assets. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982). Furthermore, the
bankruptcy code requires disclosure only "as far as reasonably practicable." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1) (1982). This suggests that disclosure ntay depend in large part on how well
the debtor kept its books. See Miller, supra note 29, at 1088 ("Presumably, if the debtor's
books and records are a shambles and the history of the debtor shows a great wavering
of fortunes, no one need sort it all out before disclosing that things are in a mess and
proposing a plan.").
125
One suggestion is that debtors follow the disclosure guidelines for the drafting
of a securities prospectus. Phelan & Cheatham, Mould I Lie to ou?-Disclosure in Bankruptcv Reoiganizations, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 140, 156-59 (1981). Although securities law is
inapplicable to the determination of adequate disclosure, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1982), as
a practical matter prospectus rules would provide an outline for complete disclosure,
especially for a reorganization involving the issuance of securities. Phelan v. Cheatham,
supra, at 158; see 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1982) (good faith provision concerning issuance of
securities in reorganizations).
126
In re Werth, 29 Bankr. 220, 223 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) ("[I]t is unnecessary to
overburden the Disclosure Statement with information which might be helpful and comprehensible to lawyers but incomprehensible to lay people."); In re Stanley Hotel, 13
Bankr. 926, 933 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) ("What [we] regard as useful .. .might be
meaningless verbiage to a 'typical investor' "); Comment, supra note 72, at 335.
127
13 Bankr. 926 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
128
Id. at 929.
129
14 Bankr. 29 (Bankr. 1981).
130 Id.at3l.
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in In re Werth, 131 the court did not define "meaningful"
32
information. 1
Objective criteria for evaluating disclosure would alleviate the
uncertainty problem to some extent.13 3 Such criteria put debtors on
notice that they must supply certain information in the statement.
Because the proponent of a plan is only required to disclose information that is "reasonably practicable"' 13 4 to obtain, the courts can
determine on a case-by-case basis whether the plan proponent has
supplied all the necessary obtainable information. 135 This approach
should also promote expediency because the criteria will help the
debtor prepare a streamlined disclosure statement, free from overburdening and unnecessary information. The criteria may also aid
creditors by providing them with information to which they may reasonably be entitled.
C.

The Factual Support Requirement for Opinions

Creditor objections to disclosure based solely on unsupported
opinions have spawned a requirement that all statements include
factual support for all assertions. Bankruptcy law is not unique in
requiring factual support for opinions. The SEC also requires pro136
jections in a prospectus to have a reasonable basis.
29 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
Id. at 223.
The case and criteria are discussed at supra text accompanying notes 81-86 (listing 11 objective criteria). See In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982). Recently, in In re Malek, 35 Bankr. 443, 443-45 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983), the
bankruptcy court delineated several areas of information which the disclosure statement
should include so that it might conform to "the letter and spirit of the Code." Id. at 443.
The court outlined eleven areas of necessary information, including the debtor's history,
a description of the reorganization plan and its execution, liquidation analysis, projection of operations, and tax consequences. Although the Malek criteria are not identical
to the A.C. Williams criteria, both schemes require similar disclosure. Unlike the A.C.
Williams court, however, the Malek court issued particularized and detailed descriptions
of the disclosure necessary to make each criterion "adequate." Id. These descriptions
may be useful barometers for determining case-by-case adequacy of disclosure.
In In re Metrocraft Publishing Servs., 39 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984), however, the court listed nineteen "[rielevant factors for evaluating the adequacy of a disclosure statement," including the eleven criteria offered in A.C. Williams. Id. at 568. As did
the A.C. Williams court, the Metrocraft court listed their criteria in skeletal form. The
court stated that the criteria would guide in determining what information "may be
mandatory, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, to meet the statutory
131
132
133

requirement of adequate information.

.

.

. The Court will address.

. .

objections with

an eye toward these enumerated factors as they pertain to (a) debtor's business and the
proposed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization." Id. at 568.
'34
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1982).
135
The A. C. Williams court suggested a case-by-case examination of the criteria. See
supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
136 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5699, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,461, at
86,202-03 (1976); see also Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Phelan & Cheatham, supra note 125, at 160.
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The legislative history of chapter 11 supports this requirement.
The Senate report accompanying chapter 11 states that "[a] plan is
necessarily predicated. . . on factually supported expectations as to
the future course of business"' 37 and, therefore, the factual basis
standard arguably could be limited to factually unsupported opinions concerning the future course of business of the reorganized
debtor. Congress also observed, however, that all disclosure should
be "in such detail as may be relevant and needed." 138 Thus, the

requirement of factual support for opinions and allegations should
not be limited to estimates or opinions on the future course of busi-

ness, especially for less sophisticated creditors.
The courts have not developed the concept of factual basis beyond citing the requirement of factual support for opinions and estimates. Courts have disapproved disclosure statements where a plan
proponent has not factually supported an estimate of the value of

property13 9 or an assertion that the proposed plan is superior to a
forced sale of property. 140 These opinions provide very little guidance to a plan proponent regarding the degree of support necessary
to constitute adequate disclosure. 14 1 Consequently, the plan propo-

nent is left to decide how much factual support to include in the
disclosure statement.
Although these guidelines are brief, courts should be willing to

invoke them to fill the gaps left by the elimination of the old valuation requirement. The factual basis requirement serves creditors'

interests by allowing them to make an informed choice regarding
the plan.1 4 2 Also, the factual basis requirement promotes expediency by informing plan proponents that unsupported opinions are
not allowed in disclosure statements.' 4 3 A case-by-case analysis of
137

138

S. REP., supra note 34, at 121.
Id.

139 See In re Fierman, 21 Bankr. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re East Redley
Corp., 16 Bankr. 429, 430 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); supra notes 97-99 and accompanying
text.
140 See, e.g., In re Civitella, 15 Bankr. 206, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
141
See, e.g., id. at 208 ("Adequate information [for support of opinions] is not strictly
defined ..
"); In re Fierman, 21 Bankr. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) ("The proponent must set forth a factual basis for the purported value of the real property."); In re
East Redley Corp., 16 Bankr. 429, 430 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (value of property must
be documented by "factual support"). Any development that shapes the definition of
disclosure is helpful to all parties. Cf. Comment, supra note 72, at 321 ("[lIt is reasonable to assume that after the Code has been in effect for a substantial period of time,
there will evolve a body of judicial decisions to offer guidance as to what standard of
adequate information the courts will require .... ").
142
See In re East Redley Corp., 16 Bankr. at 430 ("The proponent must set forth a
factual basis for the purported value of the property. Such information is essential for a
party weighing the credibility and merits of the plan .

. .

. This data will provide the

parties entitled to vote on the plan with necessary information.").
143 One student commentator argues that any opinion, even if supported by fact, is
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adequacy should not be undermined because the courts must ultimately determine what factual basis is adequate under the circum144
stances of each case.
D. Approval of Inconsistent Disclosure
The courts have generally approved disclosure statements without addressing objections to inconsistent or contradictory information. 145 This approach is generally consistent with the concerns of
maximizing creditor protection and minimizing costs. There are instances, however, where the courts should resolve such inconsistencies at the approval hearing, rather than passing the problems on to
the parties voting on the plan.
There are three situations in which the problem of inconsistent
disclosure arises. First, there are inconsistencies between the disclosure statement and evidence incorporated within the disclosure
statement. 146 One rationale for defending the courts' rejection of
objections to such inconsistencies is that the creditors may find the
plan unsuitable because of the inconsistent statements. This is precisely what a disclosure statement is supposed to reveal.' 4 7 A second justification for allowing the inconsistencies is to view the
objectionable claims as "opinions" or "estimates" and the incorporated evidence as "factual basis." The creditor is suitably protected
under the factual basis standard because he is given a basis for the
48
debtor's claims with which he can make an informed judgment.
When this basis is inconsistent with the assertion, creditors may reject the plan.
The courts' refusal to reject plans with inconsistencies furthers
the goal of expediency because the creditors may negotiate outside
of court to settle differences on the plan, thus saving time and
money that would have been spent on judicial resolution of the matimproper. Comment, supra note 72, at 323. The student concludes that "[t]his line of
cases ... acknowledges that the disclosure statement is not the place for a bottom-line
opinion. It is inappropriate to lobby, even if supporting facts are present." Id. The
legislative history of § 1125 refutes this position. See In re Egan, 33 Bankr. at 676.
144
See S. REP., supra note 34, at 121 (estimates of future course of debtor's business
should be factually supported in as much detail as is relevant and necessary; kind and
form of information are left to court's discretion).
145
See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 72, at
334 ("Courts have allowed inconsistencies and contradictions in disclosure
statements.").
146 This may have been the problem in In re Hughes Marina, 16 Bankr. 6 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1980) (claims regarding future business prospects inconsistent with tax
returns).
147
148

Id.

For a discussion of how factual basis for opinions and estimates may protect the
parties' interests, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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ter. 14 9 Moreover, it may be easier for the parties to resolve the inconsistencies in the cooperative atmosphere of negotiation rather
than in the adversarial setting of the courtroom.
A second inconsistency problem occurs when the disclosed information contradicts the creditors' own independently gathered information. 150 Again, the courts have found that a creditor needs to
be informed only to the extent that he may make a judgment on the
plan. A sophisticated creditor brings his own information to the disclosure process and can spot potential problems. A difficulty arises,
however, when a creditor is unsophisticated and does not have access to information with which to evaluate the disclosure. In furtherance of the policy of creditor protection, courts should be ready
to require the plan proponent to remedy the inconsistency when unsophisticated creditors are involved.
The third type of problem may be termed "pure contradiction,"
in which one statement or figure in the disclosure statement directly
contradicts another statement or figure in the same disclosure.' 5 ' If
the creditor who confronts this "pure contradiction" is sophisticated in the sense that he has the information to determine which
statement is correct, then the creditor can make an informed judgment and, under the earlier analysis, the objections may rightfully
be dismissed. Nevertheless, the objecting creditor is not always sophisticated and may depend solely on the disclosure statement for
his information. Absent resolution of these conflicts at the approval
hearing, a court's approval of the plan does not enhance these
52
creditors' understanding of the statement.
149 The approval hearing for the disclosure statement does not consider or determine the feasibility of the plan and is not a venue for consideration of the plan. See In re
A.C. Williams, 25 Bankr. 173, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (feasibility of plan is considered at confirmation hearing, not at approval hearing); In re Stanley Hotel, 13 Bankr.
926, 929-30 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (approval hearing is designed to determine whether
disclosure statement contains adequate information; "merits" of plan are considered at
confirmation hearing).
150
This may have been the problem in In re A.C. Williams, 25 Bankr. at 176 (objecting creditors attempted to prove inconsistency at hearing).
151 This may have been the case in In re Stanley Hotel, 13 Bankr. at 930 (creditor
objections to "internal inconsistencies").
152
One student commentator concedes that "it might seem a bit myopic to expect
creditors to sift through these contradictions since this puts a premium on disinformation .... ." Comment, supra note 72, at 323. Moreover, once the prerequisites are
achieved, a plan that includes such an approved disclosure statement may be crammed
down over the dissent of the minority creditors. See supra note 29. Cramdown is beyond
the scope of this Note, but one recent development deserves mention. In In re Union
County Wholesale Tobacco & Candy Co., 8 Bankr. 442, 443 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1981), the
court intimated that, where a plan leaves a class unimpaired, that class is deemed to have
accepted the plan under § 1126(o, and the debtors can proceed to cramdown without
filing a disclosure statement. See Miller, supra note 29, at 1090-91 n.200. If indeed a
proponent may proceed to cramdown merely by leaving one class unimpaired, it is a
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Honest mistakes that could be easily corrected may cause creditors to reject the entire plan. Because a debtor does not have an
obligation to disclose further information once the disclosure statement is approved, a creditor, unaware of the character of the error,
may reject a plan because of a contradiction resulting from a typo1 53
graphical error or an honest miscalculation.
Nothing in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure' 5 4 nor in the
code prohibits a court from resolving such disputes at the hearing.' 5 5 Moreover, courts have the option of conducting asset valuations to verify disclosure accuracy.' 56 In an approval hearing,
however, the judge is only an arbiter with limited supervisory capabilities.' 5 7 Because he must depend on the litigants for the facts, it
is unclear whether he should take an affirmative role in resolving
these contradictions at the disclosure hearing. To prevent creditors
from rejecting plans with honest miscalculations appearing as inconsistencies and to protect unsophisticated creditors from misinterpreting these inconsistencies, courts should require the plan
proponent to amend the disclosure statement when this action is
readily feasible. If the proponent shows that the inconsistencies are
the result of miscalculations or typographical errors, courts should
58
return the disclosure statement for amendment or clarification.1
short step to the situation in which a creditor may propose a reorganization plan, leave
itself or its class unimpaired, and proceed to cramdown its plan against the other creditors.
153 One commentator has noted that the parties may feel pressure to get a plan
approved as quickly as possible.
The legislative history suggests that Congress considered disclosure a response to. . . the need for "some form of investor protection in order to
make it a fairer reorganization vehicle." The flaw in this reasoning is
that, under Chapter XI .

. .

. there was no compulsion to get a plan

ready-no four to six month framework. "HURRY UP PLEASE IT'S
TIME!" is a phenomenon of the new Code.
Miller, supra note 29, at 1091 (footnotes omitted).
154
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(b) (court is charged only to determine adequacy of
disclosure statement).
155 Bankruptcy courts may have an independent duty to ensure that the requirements for confirmation, including adequate disclosure, are met despite creditor apathy.
See In re Landscaping Servs., Inc., 39 Bankr. 588, 590 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) ("Even in
the absence of creditor objections, the court has an independent duty to determine that
the confirmation requirements of 11 U.S.C. 1129 are met and the duty to ascertain the
debtor's 'good faith.'

").

E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982); H.R. REP., supra note 17, at 227.
See Miller, supra note 29, at 1099-1101.
158 In In re Stanley Hotel, 13 Bankr. at 934, the court required the debtor to amend
the disclosure statement to correct all typographical errors. It may be that these errors
contributed to the"internal inconsistencies" to which the creditors objected and that the
court indeed adopted a remedial approach to this type of inconsistency. One student
suggests that this approach might perhaps be justified "[if] the typographical errors significantly altered the meaning of the information. However, because the [Stanley Hotel]
decision is silent as to the rationale and facts, the precedential value of this decision is
questionable." Comment, supra note 72, at 334.
156
157
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The time and money saved by having the debtor amend quickly,
rather than risking unnecessary rejection, and the added creditor
protection provided by clarification outweigh any benefits of letting
the reorganization proceed with a contradictory disclosure
statement.
CONCLUSION

In handling the spectrum of objections to the adequacy of disclosure, the bankruptcy courts have generally furthered the aims of
chapter 1 l's new disclosure scheme. The requirements of extensive
disclosure and factual support for opinions promote creditor protection. Guidelines for disclosure, including the brief opinions interpreting the factual support requirement and the A.C. Williams
criteria for determining the extent of the disclosure, promote expediency by giving all parties an indication of the required contents of
a disclosure statement.
The courts' general refusal to uphold objections to inconsistent
statements is also likely to promote the interests of expediency and
creditor protection. Where feasible, courts should recognize that
unsophisticated creditors may not possess the resources accurately
to judge the disclosure and may reject it for inconsistencies. Thus,
when a plan proponent shows that an inconsistency is easily correctible, courts should require resolution at the approval hearing.
Nicholas S. Gatto

